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1. Basic assumptions and summary 
The present position paper is based on few assumptions regarding the aim of a 
“Comparative Spatial Planning Research” (CSPR), which it seems worth making explicit in 
advance. 
1. In order to add value to planning research and practice, the ARL CSPR purpose should 
be addressed to assess how (European) planning systems in force are respectively 
positioned according to common and explicit criteria (possibly also in a trend perspective), 
and not be limited to represent general classifications. 
The aim of comparing planning systems or cultures is not new (for a compendium, see: 
Nadin & Stead, 2008) and lies on the will to contribute to planning progress indeed. 
However, comparisons developed so far are generally addressed to classify “ideal types” 
of planning systems1, while the opportunity of ranking or scoring such systems or types 
according to shared criteria or indicators is usually not considered. This may happen for 
various understandable reasons (e.g. intrinsic complexity of planning, consequent 
‘weakness’ of planning knowledge, difficulties of transnational comparisons, academic bon 
ton etc.). Be that as it may, consequences (unintended) of renouncing to adopt explicit 
evaluation criteria for planning systems and practices are the persisting underestimation of 
planning as a scientific or epistemic field (see: http://scientific.thomson.com/isi/) and, more 
important, a minor effectiveness in the information of concerned decision-makers and 
operators. Therefore, while international institutions (OECD, World Bank, UN etc.) are 
increasingly active in comparing national trends and evolutions in a globalising context, 
they are generally aphasic towards not so indifferent activities such as urban and regional 
planning and territorial governance. Even the EU, which has found necessity to implement 
spatial and urban policies in order to apply the cohesion objective and to foster integration, 
seems to have renounced to deepen a specific reflection on planning systems’ capacities 
after the Compendium publication (CEC, 1997).  
2. Despite difficulties, the evidence of both existing similarities and differences among 
planning systems as well as their evolutionary capacity suggest that a comparative 
analysis addressed to represent how planning systems are positioned with respect to 
common criteria is possible in principle.  
In this view, comparisons developed so far and existing ideal types of planning systems 
and cultures are certainly a useful basis for analysis. However, this paper suggests that a 
broad conceptualisation of what planning systems are ‘in nature’ and how they use to 
absolve their social function is also necessary, in order to share criteria and methods for 
more effective comparison. Particularly, this paper propose to consider that planning 
systems are ‘technologies’ and, as such, dealing with “a species' usage and knowledge of 
tools and crafts” and affecting “a species' ability to control and adapt to its environment”2. 
However, since planning systems operate according to established institutional 
frameworks and processes to absolve their function, they are different from other and 
more usual technologies. The concept of ‘institutional technology’ will be therefore adopted 
in order to illustrate the specificity of planning systems in their overall functioning 
                                            
1 “Two main approaches are evident in classifying spatial planning systems. The first starts from other 
classifications (or families) of the legal and administrative systems within which planning operates, while the 
second seeks to apply a wider set of criteria but nevertheless produces a similar set of ideal types” (Nadin & 
Stead, 2008, p. 38). 
2 Definitions by Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology). More precisely, "’technology’ can refer to 
material objects of use to humanity, such as machines, hardware or utensils, but can also encompass 
broader themes, including systems, methods of organization, and techniques” (ibid.).  
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(diachronic perspective), as well as in their capacity to evolve and to produce innovation 
(synchronic perspective). This may explain also how planning cultures relate to planning 
systems in respective institutional contexts, according to reciprocal but indirect and non-
linear influence games.   
3. If the aim of assessing how planning systems are positioned with respect to common 
criteria is accepted, one topical aspect to be addressed is the planning systems’ capacity 
to evolve from a ‘conformative model’ (i.e. the aspiration to ‘conform’ spatial developments 
to general strategies) to a ‘performative model’ (i.e. the ability to admit those developments 
which ‘perform’ strategies). 
Despite the variety of planning systems typologies, this paper argues that, because of 
historical and cultural reasons, a ‘conformative model’ features the most of planning 
systems currently existing in the world and in Europe. However, a ‘performative model’ is 
not idealistic but, remaining an exception among planning systems, is increasingly 
experienced in Europe thanks to the EU non-statutory territorial governance processes 
fostered since the 1990s. As a more general explanation, coherent with what mentioned 
about planning systems’ capacity to evolve and to produce innovation, it seems that a 
worldwide ‘governance’ context may have posed the conditions for planning systems to 
pursue performative aims (being conformative expectations the more and more useless in 
current times). This, of course, may happen more or less quickly, more or less consciously 
and in a variety of ways in each institutional context, also depending on the existing 
arrangements and cultural backgrounds of respective planning systems. Since these 
differences and, overall, the performative capacity of planning systems are not neutral 
aspects in a competitive scenario of globalisation, this should be, after all, the focus of a 
high profile and more incisive “Comparative Spatial Planning Research”.  
Based on these assumptions, the present paper prosecutes with a proposal of 
conceptualisation of planning systems as ‘institutional technologies’, both in a diachronic 
and in a synchronic perspective (section 2). Conformative and performative models of 
planning systems will be then illustrated and compared (section 3). Finally, some working 
hypotheses which may guide the ARL-CSPR will be formulated (section 4).  
 
2. Planning systems as ‘institutional technologies’: a proposal of conceptualisation 
Land use regulation (here and below intended in the wide meaning of ‘government of 
territorial transformations’) is the government function which, accordingly with established 
constitutional rights, urban and regional planning is historically asked to accomplish: “For 
the final output of such a process is the act of physical development (or, in some cases, 
the decision not to develop, but to leave the land as it is)” (Hall, 2002, p. 3).  
Land use regulation is therefore exerted locally according to national planning legislations 
in modern states. Since land use regulation relates to complex (and often vital) decisions 
requiring vertical and horizontal coordination of policies, planning systems are used to 
assign statutory and not statutory powers to public authorities at various levels (local, sub-
regional, regional, national). So, land use regulation is certainly a ‘special’ government 
function, with clear consequences on the technical nature of planning too. This indeed 
does not concern a sector knowledge (planning is integrative towards various sector 
policies) and, coping with varieties of policies, it is constantly challenged by necessary 
relations with social behaviours and with mutual learning practices. 
However, land use regulation and territorial governance processes are wherever allowed 
and conditioned by the functioning of planning systems. The following sub-sections are an 
attempt of conceptualising how planning systems operate in principle, avoiding any 
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reference to one or another specific planning system. In other words, the following 
conceptualisation is supposed to be adaptable to any existing planning system. 
Particularly, the functioning of planning systems will be first conceptualised in a diachronic 
perspective (i.e. as a stable routine, without considering possible changes occurring 
overtime in systems), and then according to a synchronic perspective (i.e. considering the 
time variable and how systems can change and evolve). 
 
2.1. A diachronic perspective 
According to Sager (2007, p. 18), among others, “planning can be seen as a technology 
for collective action aimed at improving the physical environment”. Since everywhere it is 
exerted according to established constitutional rights, however, planning is different from 
other technologies in that it is strictly related to ‘institutions’3. In this view, planning systems 
are nothing but ‘institutional technologies’, allowing public authorities to exert regulation 
powers, legitimately assigned by respective social communities, on territorial 
transformation processes.   
More precisely, a planning system might be somehow imagined as a ‘hinge’ between the 
‘government system’ (in a general sense) and the ‘spatial production and consumption 
system’4. In this framework, the government capacities towards the spatial production and 
consumption system largely depend on the planning system ability both to define land use 
rules and to make them effective in the spatial development process. Since 
implementation is a typical productive function (therefore depending on the spatial 
production and consumption system)5, however, the effectiveness of land use regulation 
passes through a complex prism of decision-making procedures, technical tools and 
interactive learning processes. 
This aspect, of course, rewards especially those theorists who have focused attention over 
the past 20 years both on the acknowledgement of urban and territorial governance 
scenarios (Stone, 1993; Bagnasco & Le Galès, 2000; Albrechts et al., 2001, 2003) and on 
the communicative perspective of planning (Forester, 1989, 1999; Alexander, 1992; Sager, 
1994, 2006; Healey, 1997). The image of ‘planning system as a hinge’, however, is helpful 
in considering that, even though government aims and governance outcomes often differ 
in practice, government and governance are necessarily coexisting dimensions of the 
planning process and cannot be assumed as mutually exclusive perspectives6.  
                                            
3 Institutions are here intended in their anthropologic meaning of social constructs by which communities of 
individuals spontaneously organise their life in common, through structures and mechanisms of social order 
and cooperation governing their behaviour. 
4 According to the original definition’s author (Mazza, 2003, 2004), ‘spatial production and consumption 
system’ means the complex of practices contributing to the physic environment transformation: private and 
public housing, buildings, infrastructures, heritage preservation and renewal, mining activities, rural and 
forest exploitation, management of the environment, and so forth. 
5 Implementation could be a function of the planning system only in a (idealistic) totalitarian regime, in which 
the spatial production and consumption system would be part of the government system (Dahrendorf, 1968; 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). In this light, of course, the recurring term ‘plan implementation’ may be 
somehow misleading. 
6 Incidentally, the concept of ‘dual planning theory’ (Sager, 2007) seems to fit a theoretical perspective aware 
of both the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of any planning system at work. “‘Dual planning theory’ 
serves both authorities and affected citizens, and the concept would not deserve much attention if the 
interests of government and governed were always in harmony. Then there would be no real duality. It is 
more thought-provoking that one and the same planning theory can be used to serve both authorities and 
ordinary citizens in ‘agonistic’ characterized by conflicting interests” (ibid., p. 2). 
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Particularly, if the building of planning decisions is or can or should be a multi-level, multi-
sector and multi-actor governance process, the ultimate outcome of planning activities is 
however a government action, because the legitimate power to modify the existing use 
rights in land belongs to public authorities. The above conceptualisation enables us to 
overcome the recurring dichotomy between ‘regulative’ and ‘strategic’ plans (Alexander & 
Faludi, 1989; Faludi, 1989, 2000b, 2006a; Mastop, 1997; Mastop & Faludi, 1997; Healey 
et al., 1997; Salet & Faludi, 2000; Albrechts, 2004, 2006), because it draws attention to the 
social role of planning as a whole. Therefore, despite the validity and usefulness of 
analytical distinctions between types of plans, the coexistence of multiple technical 
functions within a planning system is rather the aspect to be addressed in order to assess 
the capacity of planning as a whole in attaining its social role.  
Four functions at least are present in every planning system (Mazza, 2003, 2004): 
1. a strategic function, concerning both the definition of goals and of policies to 
achieve them, and the construction of (spatial) frameworks for action; 
2. a design function, regarding the definition of policies and projects for spatial 
development;  
3. a regulative function, dealing with land use regulation in a strict sense; and 
4. an informative function, dealing with the production and circulation of information. 
Among them, only the latter (4) is a general function, in the sense that it crosses the 
former ones with the aims of improving interaction, guaranteeing transparency in planning 
processes and favouring consensus-building. The others are specific functions, in the 
sense that they respond to respective and autonomous objectives in the planning process. 
Particularly, the regulative function (3) has by definition a regulating nature, to 
acknowledge and to guarantee use rights in land. It is therefore based on established and 
agreed rights and values. In contrast, the strategic (1) and design (2) functions have a 
transformative nature, to define new goals and subsequent proposals of transformation. 
They are, therefore, referred to as new values and possible rights in land. 
According to the above tripartite relationship between ‘government system’, ‘planning 
system’ and ‘spatial production and consumption system’, these functions appear to be 
variously active in two (interlinked) spheres of interaction (Figure 1). 
The first sphere regards the interaction between the government system and the planning 
system. The institutional dimension of planning is therefore prevailing in this sphere. This 
means the planning system works here all in all as an ‘institutional technology’, allowing 
public authorities to connect the existing production and consumption processes to their 
intentions of regulation. Here formal and informal interactive processes, producing 
strategies, plans, policies and projects, are developed. The planning system combines its 
technical functions in order to produce general tools for territorial governance (usually 
plans) in this sphere. 
The second sphere regards the interaction between the planning system and the spatial 
production and consumption system. The role of planning as institutional technology is 
therefore open to further public and private design technologies. Here the general tools for 
territorial governance, produced in the first sphere, become subject and source of further 
formal and informal interactive processes, even more complex (the number and variety of 
stakeholders increase) and finalised to implementation. This latter, however, as above 
mentioned, is an exclusively productive function and is therefore excluded from the 
sphere’s domain. Rather, the design and control of implementation projects, with reference 
to plans, is the product of interaction. In this sphere, therefore, the planning system exerts 
 6
its technical functions according to conformative or performative objectives (the difference 
of which will be addressed in section 3). 
Figure 1 – Planning system as a ‘hinge’ and two spheres of interaction in territorial governance 
 
 
The above illustration may appear somehow abstract, because it is finalised to stress how 
the planning system functions are employed in quite distinct interactive processes when 
addressed to plans elaboration or to spatial development control. The sense of abstraction 
is especially due to the fact that processes of plans elaboration and of spatial development 
control take place almost contemporarily in practice and are continuously influenced by 
mutual interaction and mutual learning activities (a crucial aspect in determining what will 
be discussed in the following sub-section). Both in theory and in practice, however, the 
linkage between the two spheres is not hierarchical nor necessarily consequential. As 
argued later in section 3, the assumption of conformative or performative objectives by the 
planning system determines the quality of such linkage and, consequently, the capacity of 
planning to respond to its social role.  
 
2.2. A synchronic perspective 
One feature of technologies is to be subject to innovation. This means, for planning 
systems too, both that innovation is possible and that, in certain circumstances, it is 
necessary to avoid the techniques obsolescence in face of change (Friedmann, 1987). 
Innovation, however, is a wild animal not easily tameable (Fagerberg, 2004): it has been 
studied for ages in a variety of further contexts, such as commerce, social systems, 
economic development and policy construction, through a wide range of approaches and 
conceptualisations.  
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Generally, innovation is understood as the successful introduction of something new and 
useful. While technological innovation is especially focused on the production of new tools 
and techniques, improving the human capacity to control and adapt to the environment, 
social innovation refers rather to new strategies, concepts, ideas and organisations that 
meet social needs of all kinds and that extend and strengthen civil society. Therefore, it 
also overlaps with innovation in public policy and governments activities. As for both 
technological and social progress, however, innovation encompasses the entire process, 
from idea to implementation, for the development of new products, services, methods, 
management practices and policies (Gardner et al., 2007).  
Whether innovation is mainly supply-pushed (based on new technological opportunities) or 
demand-led (based on social needs and market requirements) has been a hotly debated 
topic. Although what exactly drives innovation in organisations and economies remains an 
open question, more recent theoretical works pose rather the accent on that innovation 
happens through complex processes that links many different players together (Sarkar, 
2007). Particularly, much of the most successful innovation proves to occur at the 
boundaries of organisations where the problems and needs of users and the potential of 
technologies can be linked together in a creative process that challenges both. 
In this light, the innovation process can and should take account of social behaviours as 
well, including constraints and opportunities given by public policy and government 
systems. According to Rogers (2003, p. 5), "[d]iffusion is the process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system”. Basing on Kondratieff’s theories on long wave market cycles (Figure 2), 
innovation would spread through society in a ‘S-curve’, as the early adopters select the 
technology first, followed by the majority, until a technology or innovation is common (see 
also: Solomou, 1986). Innovation diffusion would therefore occur over time through five 
stages: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation. Accordingly, 
the innovation-decision process is the cycle through which any decision-making unit 
passes (1) from first knowledge of an innovation, (2) to forming an attitude toward the 
innovation, (3) to a decision to adopt or reject, (4) to implementation of the new idea, and 
(5) to confirmation of this decision (Rogers, 2003, p. 161). 
Figure 2 – Simplified Kondratieff wave pattern (source: www open source, 2008) 
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Basically, such a S-curve originates as responding broadly to Kondratieff’s phases of 
‘improvement’ and ‘prosperity’. ‘Recession’ and ‘depression’ phases may determine or be 
determined by the emergence of successive S-curves, insofar as new technologies can 
come along to replace older ones and continue to drive growth upwards (Figure 3). Of 
course, the length of life of each S-curve may depend on several factors. According to 
Rogers (2003), the speed of technology adoption is determined however by two 
characteristics: the speed at which adoption takes off, and the speed at which later growth 
occurs, specially due to network effects. Lastly, while disruptive technologies may radically 
change the diffusion patterns for some established technology by starting a different 
competing S-curve, path dependence may also lock certain technologies in place. 
Figure 3 – Innovation life cycle (source: www open source, 2008) 
 
 
In this light, to consider planning systems as ‘institutional technologies’ seems to fit the 
opportunity to look at innovation in planning as a process “based on a multi-dimensional 
view of innovation, economic dynamics and community governance” (Moulaert & Sekia, 
2002, p. 299). In accordance with the conceptualisation previously observed in a 
diachronic perspective, changes in planning systems can occur indeed as a result of 
mutual interaction and mutual learning processes between the two aforementioned 
‘spheres’, through which ‘government system’ and ‘spatial production and consumption 
system’ are connected by planning system. Therefore, a conceptualisation of (possible) 
innovation processes in planning systems should both recognise “the key role of 
institutional dynamics in innovation and territorial development” and reject, at the same 
time, “the narrowly defined instrumentality of institutional dynamics for the improvement of 
market competitiveness of a territory” (ibid.; see also: Gualini, 2001). 
Accordingly, the above illustrated innovation life cycle may be supposed to pass, in the 
case of planning systems, through a more complex process of social experience (SE), 
public acknowledgement (PA) and institutional codification (IC). These are, in other words, 
necessary momentums allowing innovation to spread over time through the five stages of 
knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation (Rogers, 2003). With 
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some acceptable simplification, such process might be represented as a sort of insider 
cycle, variously pivoted on these three momentums during its course, altogether triggering 
and enhancing the innovation S-curve (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 – Innovation life cycle applied to planning systems as institutional technologies 
 
 
In general terms, an ascending phase (E + P) is triggered by practical experiences of 
problems and solutions for land use regulation, emerging in particularly affected local 
circumstances. This may convince the concerned public authorities to acknowledge 
problems and to apply solutions. Especially whereas successful, experienced solutions 
may lead, on their turn, to legitimise new aims and tools for land use regulation in planning 
systems. A change of technology may occur at this point, and the diffusion of innovation 
can start along with its later growth, through widespread application and network effects. 
This corresponds to a descending phase of the insider cycle (R + D), in which new 
legislation is applied more systematically by public authorities at various levels, often 
requiring reinterpretations, simplifications and re-adaptations at various extents, according 
to local specificities. New local practices, problems and possible solutions may emerge 
therefore in new operational contexts, thus leading to the possible start of a new cycle (the 
breakthrough).  
Beyond conceptual simplification, this process should be imagined in fact as a continuous 
and selective interaction of multiple cycles, parallel or intersected in each institutional 
context, because ‘trigger places’ and cyclic dynamics of innovation are potentially endless 
and not predictable (as it happens, after all, to any technology). However, as markets’ 
competitiveness and openness tend generally to favour innovation in products, the 
organisational quality of institutions tends to frame the innovation opportunities of planning.  
Basically, political awareness and institutional capacity are the driving forces influencing 
respectively the measures of ‘advancement’ and of ‘applied effort’ in the innovation 
process. As shown in figure, they both exert a fundamental role in the cycle ‘top’ phase (P 
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+ R), which is pivoted on the ‘institutional codification’ of expected changes in planning 
system. If this crucial provision is missing, occurring for instance when path dependence 
prevails, it seems clear that the innovation curve will not be able to turn to its phase of 
major spread through society, and that the (potential) innovation process may even abort 
sooner or later.   
Besides, social evaluation of local outcomes of planning is fundamental for triggering and 
addressing possible new innovation cycles. This means that planners responsibility is not 
limited to apply their own expertise in making plans according to current theoretical trends, 
but regards especially their contribution in guiding, as the technology depositaries, the 
social evaluation of planning outcomes. In other words, based on Schumpeter’s (1949) 
concepts, planning cannot simply exert an ‘adaptive response’ to change, but is 
continuously required to find a ‘creative response’. To deserve its social usefulness, it has 
indeed to innovate the government system’s command options on a fatally ever-changing 
spatial production and consumption system, especially when such command options 
appear to be blunt. 
In conclusion, innovation opportunities in planning systems have to be considered in the 
light of relationships between the government system and the spatial production and 
consumption system factually established (between which the planning system operates 
as a ‘hinge’). In this framework, social evaluation, political awareness and institutional 
capacity are all equally indispensable ingredients for the achievement of innovation in 
planning systems, which is also the way to change the nature of those relationships. The 
cyclic shape of the process requires an adequate and continue presence of these 
ingredients in order to make innovation widely applicable and, therefore, socially useful.  
 
3. Two models of planning system 
Against this backdrop, we may assume that, despite the existing variety of planning 
traditions and approaches (Newman & Thornley, 1996; CEC, 1997; Balchin et al., 1999; 
ESPON, 2007a; Nadin & Stead, 2008), two planning system models are basically present 
in the world and in Europe: a more traditional and widespread one, aspiring to ‘conform’ 
spatial developments to general strategies; and a different and less institutionalised one, 
promoting those developments expected to ‘perform’ strategies. 
As a matter of terminological clarification, whereas conformance evocates primarily a 
“correspondence in form, manner, or character” or an “action in accordance with some 
specified standard or authority”, performance poses rather the accent on “the execution of 
an action” or “the fulfilment of a claim, promise, or request” (definitions by the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://info.britannica.co.uk/). 
Particularly, a ‘conformative model’ responds to the traditional approach adopted by 
planning systems, still in force in almost all European countries as well as in the USA and 
in the most of modern states. Here, planning systems are generally expected to operate 
according to a conformance principle: spatial development projects must ultimately 
conform themselves to collective strategies converging in a local plan, usually through a 
binding land use zoning design. As a true exception, which may be explained by 
contextual reasons, a ‘performative model’ has been adopted only in the post-war UK 
planning system (and, as far as the author is informed, in some other Commonwealth 
countries). Here, local authorities are generally not conditioned by binding zoning designs 
and are endowed of a discretionary power to admit those development projects expected 
to perform collective strategies proposed by plans. It is worth observing in addition that, 
although in the absence of a formal planning system, such performative model operates 
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also in current EU territorial governance processes: of course, no statutory planning 
decisions can be assumed in this case but the rationale adopted is, basically, that projects 
allowed to obtain co-financing for implementation are those expected to perform a 
Community programme. 
These two planning models relate to respective cultural assumptions and technical 
procedures finally producing, in virtue of juridical effects, different operational 
consequences on spatial development and on territorial governance. The following sub-
sections focus on features and effects, respectively, of conformative and of performative 
planning systems. 
 
3.1. Conformative planning systems 
Although in multiple forms, a conformative model of planning system is largely widespread 
in almost all European countries, in the USA and elsewhere for historical and cultural 
reasons. Modern planning institutionalisation put down roots indeed in the phase of 
industrial and bourgeois revolution and of the formation of modern states (Chapin, 1965; 
McLoughlin, 1969; Faludi, 1973; Taylor, 1998; Hall, 2002). In the 20th century, particularly, 
the pressing needs of post-war reconstruction and of Fordist urbanisation have supported 
a planning model based on the ideals of hierarchy (top-down relations between planning 
tiers) and of dirigisme (state-led implementation of plans) almost everywhere in the world. 
Even the most progressive planners, conditioned (and guaranteed) by an institutional and 
cultural context inspired to the welfare state paternalism, have generally nourished the 
assumption that the State, as the keeper of collective interest, is expected to ‘conform’ 
projects of property development to its own strategy. 
Therefore, despite possible changes occurred overtime in respective legislations, planning 
systems are still today based on the ideal assumption that plan implementation responds 
to the capacity of making spatial development projects conform to the collective strategy 
proposed by the plan. Such assumption is applied in practice by assigning (new) use rights 
in land in accordance with the designed collective strategy, usually transferred in a zoning 
map. Consequently, those projects that conform to the plan are automatically legitimated 
for development. 
In brief, the technical cornerstone of conformative planning model is that the plan is 
intended to be a binding public strategy, to be achieved by assigning rules (use rights in 
land) that are expected to be followed in public and private projects implementation. The 
cultural ideals of hierarchy and of dirigisme, justified by the assumption that the State is 
the keeper of the collective interest, lie at the root of such formulation. 
These technical and ideal principles imply a precise ‘systemic’ consequence, with 
reference to the above conceptualisation of planning systems (section 2.1). According to 
the conformative model, the two spheres of interaction (government system / planning 
system and planning system / spatial production and consumption system) indeed melt in 
a unique pot of decision-making processes and of technical functions. In such a melting 
pot, particularly, the transformative functions (strategic and design functions) and the 
regulative function of planning are factually interlaced in the general tool for territorial 
governance produced in the first sphere (the zoning design). In other words, spatial 
development control is somehow anticipated (perhaps pretentiously) in the strategy 
design, which is provided with a binding power indeed. 
Therefore, as a juridical consequence, incoherencies between the plan and projects have 
to be resolved by conformance criteria: only (and all) those development projects that 
conform to the plan shall be legitimate for implementation. Of course, this regards 
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especially the horizontal relations of plan management at a local level, where use rights in 
land are usually delivered. The effects of conforming planning are less visible in the upper-
level plans (in which strategic planning practices have indeed flourished more easily). But, 
for the very same juridical effect, incoherencies between plans at different scales (vertical 
relations) are often resolved in favour of local plans (or of the assigned use rights, 
however), to the detriment of wider spatial strategies and projects.  
 
3.2. Performative planning systems 
As mentioned, a distinct performative model of planning system has been institutionalised 
only in the United Kingdom and in some other Commonwealth countries since the post-
war. As an exception among other European countries, the UK has not pursued the 
exercise of conformance powers in planning for a long time7. In this case, the fundamental 
task of project evaluation and negotiation is legitimately carried out by local authorities, 
which are not conditioned by binding zoning designs8. This finds a partial explanation in 
civic, legal and administrative traditions, which are of course one main element 
distinguishing planning ideal types9. A complete explanation, however, cannot be 
regardless of the nationalisation of development rights in land occurred in the UK in the 
post-war period10. It seems reasonable, in other words, that a major control power 
assigned to the State through the development rights nationalisation may have allowed the 
removal of the need for adoption of binding zoning plans. If acceptable, this rewards what 
above discussed about the wide possibilities and complexities of planning systems 
evolution (section 2.2). 
Be that as it may, the ideal assumption featuring this model is that the plan is a policy 
reference, the implementation of which passes through the approval of projects that prove 
themselves capable to perform the agreed collective strategy. Such assumption is applied 
in practice by assigning new development rights only if and when projects have been 
positively evaluated, both under the political and technical profiles. 
Therefore, the technical cornerstone of the performative planning model is that plan is 
developed as a not-binding public strategy, the power of which is political and not legal nor 
judicial. Rules (use rights in land) are assigned for implementing those public and private 
projects that are capable of contributing to the public strategy. In accordance with the 
pragmatism of British common law tradition (Booth, 2003, 2007), the ideals of hierarchy 
                                            
7 Notably, after the UK 1947 Town and country planning Act, “the development plan did not of itself imply that 
permission would be granted for particular developments simply because they appeared to be in conformity 
with the plan” (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 93). The UK planning system was improved by the 1968 Act, 
assigning to structure plans the provision of strategic tiers of development and to local plans the provision of 
(not binding) detailed guidance on land use. Despite the effects of the 1980s ‘deregulation’ (Healey et al., 
1988; Tewdwr-Jones, 1996), “[t]he essential features of the 1968 system are still in place today” 
(Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 93; see also: CEC, 2000a). 
8 The 1947 Act established that, “in granting permission to develop, local authorities could impose ‘such 
conditions as they think fit’” (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 93). Therefore “it is fundamentally a discretionary 
system in which decisions on particular development proposals are made as they arise, against the policy 
background of a generalised plan” (ibid., p. 92). See also: Davies (1980), Tewdwr-Jones (1999) and Booth 
(2003, 2007). 
9 “…planning system based on the civil code traditions of Napoleonic Europe have been constructed in a 
very different way from those whose base is English common law” (Booth, 2007, p. 127). 
10 “All the owners where thus placed in the position of owning only the existing (1947) use rights and values 
in their land” (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 21). See also Booth (2002). 
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and of dirigisme inspiring the conformative model are therefore overcome by principles of 
vertical and horizontal subsidiarity in the performative model. 
The systemic consequence with reference to the aforementioned planning systems’ 
conceptualisation (section 2.1) is that the two spheres of interaction (government system / 
planning system and planning system / spatial production and consumption system) 
remain quite distinct ambits, as for both decision-making processes and technical 
functions. Therefore, the transformative functions (strategic and design functions) and the 
regulative function are not confused previously in a unique tool (the binding zoning plan) 
and can be equally determinant for implementation decisions. The crucial importance of 
this separation, which remains clearly visible in the UK planning system at work11, is 
somehow confirmed by the 1980s attempt of ‘deregulation’, which was primarily addressed 
to make local authorities “unable to control development effectively in their areas” 
(Tewdwr-Jones, 1996, p. 5). 
A legal consequence is that incoherencies between plan and projects are not prejudicially 
decided but can be resolved by performance criteria, since the use rights in land are the 
existing ones until a public decision says otherwise. Again, this regards especially the 
horizontal relations in the plan management at the local level, where use rights in land are 
delivered. As for the vertical relations between different tiers of planning, however, this 
implies that spatial strategies and projects at wider scales may be expected to shape the 
implementation process more effectively, once they have been agreed at local level. 
Which said, on the one hand, is nothing but a confirmation of the basic conceptual findings 
of strategic planning theories: convincing spatial visions and incentives to local action are 
in the end more effective than any pretentious attempt of top-down imposition (Healey et 
al., 1997; Salet & Faludi, 2000; Albrechts et al., 2003; Albrechts, 2004, 2006). On the other 
hand, it adds that the modalities of land use regulation at the local level are not indifferent 
as for the success of wider strategic spatial policies as well. 
 
4. Working hypotheses 
Based on the analytical framework proposed in sections 2 and 3, this final section is aimed 
at addressing, in the form of working hypotheses, some argumentations which may be 
helpful in guiding the proposed “Comparative Spatial Planning Research” according to 
assumptions and aims recalled in section 1. 
Particularly, the following four working hypotheses will be addressed: 
1. In principle, a performative model of planning system operates better than a 
conformative model in allowing urban and regional planning to accomplish its social role 
(addressed to the government function of land use regulation or the public government of 
territorial transformations); 
2. As historical and cultural trends have oriented a widespread institutionalisation of 
conformative planning systems in modern states, current evolutions in a ‘governance’ 
context are enhancing the necessity of performative planning systems; 
                                            
11 “Even today, the main substance of the planning system is administered by governmental profession 
planning officers, either within forward planning teams (responsible for preparing planning policies) or 
development control teams (responsible for determining applications for planning permission by individuals 
and organisations)” (Tewdwr-Jones, 1996, p. 1). See also Davies (1980). 
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3. Accordingly, also thanks to the EU territorial governance effects, more recent 
innovations in European (conformative) planning systems appear to be increasingly 
oriented to aims of performance;  
4. The performance of planning systems is something different from what commonly 
assumed in literature as the performance of plans: this should be taken into account for 
possible comparative evaluation of planning systems. 
 
4.1. Performative planning systems operate better ‘in principle’ 
Trying to sum up what argued in section 3 (Table 1), the difference between conformative 
and performative models of planning system does not deal with matters of planning style 
(regulative versus strategic), nor of planning scale (local planning versus spatial planning), 
nor of type of plan (land use plans versus strategic plans). These are aspects which are 
usually all present and equally indispensable within each planning system indeed. 
Table 1 – Two models of planning system 
 Conformative planning system Performative planning system 
Principles Hierarchy, dirigisme Vertical and horizontal subsidiarity 
Technical assumptions 
(Local) plan as a binding collective 
strategy 
(Local) plan as a not-binding 
collective strategy 
‘Systemic’ 
consequences 
Fusion of ‘spheres of interaction’: 
planning functions are melted 
Distinct ‘spheres of interaction’: 
planning + control 
Juridical effects 
Plan/projects incoherencies resolved 
according to assigned use rights in land 
Plan/projects coherencies as basis to 
assign use rights in land 
Advantages Certainty Flexibility 
Disadvantages Rigidity Discretion 
Political and technical 
responsibilities 
Centred on plan elaboration 
Distributed between plan elaboration 
and projects evaluation 
In force 
almost all European countries, USA and 
the most of modern states 
UK and some Commonwealth 
countries, EU territorial governance 
 
The topical distinction regards, rather, the modalities of delivering development rights in 
land in the face of agreed collective strategies. In the conformative model (the more 
traditional and widespread in the world and in Europe), development rights are assigned in 
advance along with the design of the collective strategy, which is therefore translated into 
a binding zoning design. In the performative model (exceptionally adopted only in the UK 
and some Commonwealth countries’ planning systems but now familiar also to the EU 
territorial governance practices), development rights may be assigned after the evaluation 
of projects, once they have been assessed to be in line with the collective strategy, which 
remains a not-binding policy reference. 
In principle, the main operational consequences of conformative planning systems (overall 
explaining the typical difficulties of territorial governance in the most of countries) may be 
pointed out as follows: 
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a. creation of binding property rights (once the plan is approved, new use rights in land 
cannot be or can hardly be revoked); 
b. creation of additional property income (new use rights in land imply higher property 
values), counteracting possible changes in public strategies; 
c. rigidity and difficulty of public strategies (any change in public strategies implies 
new assignations of use rights in land, with the aforementioned consequences); 
d. incentive to spatial development but public control reduced to an ‘administrative 
burden’ (conformance control, with scarce or no possibility of improving projects 
apart from their formal coherence with the plan); 
e. decrease of political and of technical accountability in planning (because of the 
difficulty of public strategies and of development control reduced to an 
administrative burden); 
f. possible creation of decision-making contexts open to corruptive practices (because 
of the decrease of political and of technical accountability in planning); and 
g. trigger of a vicious circle in territorial governance processes (spatial strategies at 
whatever scale, when agreed for local implementation, are transfigured by what is 
illustrated above in points ‘a’ to ‘f’). 
On the contrary, the advantages of a performative model may be summed up as follows: 
a. better control of spatial transformation and of property income (no development 
rights in land nor higher values are previously guaranteed); 
b. more flexibility and political autonomy in the design of public strategies (changes in 
public strategies do not imply the assignation of new use rights in land); 
c. pivotal function of spatial development control through technical evaluations 
(performance control, aimed at improving projects with regard to the collective 
strategy objectives); 
d. better accountability of political and of technical responsibilities (not simply in the 
strategy design, but especially in projects approval); 
e. overall incentive to social responsibility and to democracy (better accountability of 
political and of technical responsibilities means more transparency); and 
f. trigger of a virtuous circle in territorial governance processes (local implementation 
ensures, for spatial strategies at whatever scale, which is illustrated above in points 
‘a’ to ‘e’). 
Against this backdrop, of course, one has to acknowledge that British technical literature is 
full of critical considerations about domestic planning practices (Healey et al., 1988; 
Tewdwr-Jones, 1996; Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Particularly, the main 
disadvantages and risks of ‘flexible zoning’ (Faludi, 1987; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999) have been 
pointed out as follows: 
1) uncertainty, affecting all developers and applicants and, particularly, the weaker 
players in the planning game (who may be better served by well-defined planning 
rights to which they can appeal); 
2) the discretionary nature of planning decisions that confer valuable development 
rights, implying a vulnerability to corruption comparable with the ‘conformative 
model’ case; and 
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3) major administrative costs and capacity limitations, due to the necessity to evaluate 
and negotiate each development project in the absence of formalised standards. 
It seems, however, that these critiques do not affect the performative model as such (so 
implying arguments in favour of the conformative model), but are basically addressed to 
problems or ‘imperfections’ of (performative) planning systems in practice with respect to 
their possible or ideal functioning. If so, these critiques are especially useful in addressing 
possible innovations in (performative) planning systems. 
As for the first critique, unless one questions that power to modify use rights in land 
belongs to public authorities (which is possible only in an anarchist perspective), certainty 
in principle can be guaranteed only by the existing use rights. It is true, however, that 
uncertainty for future developments tends to depress local markets in practice, with 
detriment to public strategies as well. The crucial problem seems, therefore, to avoid the 
mismatch between collective strategies, announced by the (not-binding) plan, and 
consequent market expectations.  
If this is the case, some useful hints for innovation in planning may come from the 
successful experience learnt by the EU structural funds and Community initiatives 
programmes and practices over the past 15-20 years. In other words, tools such as 
recurring calls for tender or application, including explicit axes and measures of 
intervention, selection criteria and performance indicators, standardised evaluation and 
monitoring processes, and so forth, could perhaps be adopted in ordinary planning as well, 
so reducing uncertainty and risk. An attentive and probably not easiest adaptation in 
planning systems would be required of course. This should be based, however, on the 
topical idea of managing the assignation of new use rights in land in this case as EU co-
funding is managed in the other. 
Additionally, a clearer indication of obligatory standards for ordinary and minor 
developments would be helpful especially for weaker subjects. Finally, the uncertainty of 
those who may be affected by negative externalities produced by new developments 
should be reduced as well. This could be attained, for instance, by the provision of 
compensation forms in favour of collective and individual interests adversely affected by 
new spatial developments, to be established in calls for tender/application and to 
consequent project evaluation. Even if apparently complicated and difficult, all this is 
feasible in principle and, at the end, the stake is that, if the cost of an absolute certainty is 
the rigidity of conformative planning systems, it would be perhaps worth trying. 
As regards the second critique, a blunt answer would be that “discretion is everywhere in 
the Anglo-American common-law tradition and cannot be avoided” (Booth, 2007, p. 132). 
More reasonably, one may argue that planning decisions are anyway exposed to such 
events, since discretion is exerted also in conformative planning systems (simply, it is 
anticipated in the phase of zoning design). It is true indeed that “the phenomenon of 
corruption (i.e. the use of one’s official position to favour someone else for personal 
benefit) has been found in both types of planning systems”12. What seems relevant here is 
that whereas project evaluation is or may be made a rather accountable activity, this can 
hardly be the case for plan design. Therefore, discretion and the corruptibility risk are in 
principle favoured by conformative planning systems, in which even most valuable use 
                                            
12 Moroni, 2007, p. 155. According to the author, this happens because “even if the planning systems of 
Continental Europe and of Great Britain are clearly in accordance with the formal and legalistic ideal of the 
constitutional state, they do not completely adhere to the more substantive ideal of the rule of law” (ibid., pp. 
154-155). 
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rights in land are conferred along with binding zoning maps, the responsibility of which is 
never subjective. 
Finally, regarding the third critique, there is no objection to the fact that an accurate 
development control process is more expensive, also in terms of institutional capacity. The 
extent to which such major costs are justifiable is of course subject to political scrutiny. For 
their part, planners should especially consider their own responsibilities in this, since a 
better knowledge of spatial qualities and of relations with social behaviours would certainly 
contribute to reduce evaluation costs and to improve institutional capacities. The lack of a 
satisfying background of updated knowledge in this field is indeed said to be one major 
delay of contemporary planning theory (Taylor, 1998). 
In conclusion, planning outcomes depend on a variety of practical and routine conditions, 
in which subjective responsibilities and human imperfectabilities often play a crucial role. In 
this light, the influence of institutional and operational frameworks is of course one variable 
of the process. However, what the above discussion suggests is that performative 
planning systems are in principle more suitable than conformative ones to let planning 
exert its social role responsibly.  
 
4.2. Performative planning systems are more suitable to a ‘governance’ context 
Since innovation in planning is a particularly complicated process, dealing with the 
complexity of historical and cultural backgrounds, social experience and institutional 
behaviours (section 2.2), theoretical evidence is permanently held in check by practical 
circumstances. Moreover, planning is a relatively ‘young’ technology, if compared with 
others developed for ages in order to satisfy needs as old as the human race. Despite the 
performative model’s best performance, one has therefore to acknowledge the worldwide 
institutionalisation of (conformative) planning systems between the 19th and the 20th 
centuries as nothing but a true historical innovation at that time (Chapin, 1965; 
McLoughlin, 1969; Faludi, 1973; Friedmann, 1989; Taylor, 1998; Hall, 2002). 
However, the evidence of decision-making difficulties in growing societal complexity 
(Dahrendorf, 1968; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973), on the one hand, and the Fordism 
crisis, the explosion of globalisation and the consequent processes of spatial 
reorganisation (Harvey, 1989; Amin & Thrift, 1994), on the other, have allowed soon to 
emerge the limits of existing planning systems. These limits were perceived basically in 
terms of effectiveness of plan implementation in the context of reconciling multi-level 
collective strategies to a growing plurality of local and individual projects of spatial 
development. Moreover, planning systems and policies are earlier coming, like any other 
regulation system, under increasing influence from the need to respond to global economic 
competition (Hutton & Giddens, 2000). In this evolution context, transnational planning is 
emerging as one distinctive feature of territorial governance in the European Union, 
although this is not based on legislation, because the European Treaties (EU, 2006) do not 
include planning competences. 
Overall, the emergence of the ‘governance’ concept, suggesting a suitable alternative to 
the idea of ‘government’ as the dominance of state power hierarchies (Painter & Goodwin, 
1995), proved particularly helpful to planning. The idea of governance as “horizontal self-
organisation among mutually interdependent actors” (Jessop, 2000, p. 15), of whom 
government is only one and with only “imperfect control” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 8), seemed 
indeed to open new promising horizons for planning theories and practices. Especially in 
Europe, where Community integration developments have boosted the reframing of urban 
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and regional policies, EU territorial governance is currently considered a driver of 
innovation in planning practices and institutions (ESPON, 2007a). 
Although the concept of governance originates from the corporate organisations 
functioning, in the early 1990s the World Bank defined it in a wider sense, as “the manner 
in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social 
resources for development” (World Bank, 1991, p. i). Particularly, three aspects of 
governance were pointed out (ibid., p. 23): 
(i) the form of political regime (parliamentary / presidential, military / civilian, 
authoritarian / democratic); 
(ii) the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources; and 
(iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in 
general, to discharge government functions. 
Among these aspects, the former relates clearly to the government nature. The latter two 
acknowledge new elements in the observation and evaluation of government activities: 
namely, the process dimension in relationships between authority and socioeconomic 
subjects; and the meaning of policies as activities addressed to ‘discharge government 
functions’ (rather than to reinforce and to empower them).   
Such new perspective has rapidly found a central place in social and political sciences 
debate, leading to suppose even a shift or transformation “from government to 
governance” (Heere, 2004). Be that more or less convincing, it is however true that a 
governance perspective has allowed to observe and to understand the emergence of new 
overlapping and complex relationships involving ‘new actors’ external to the political arena, 
as this was understood previously (Kooiman, 1993; Painter and Goodwin, 1995).  
In brief, the governance concept has been understood in the light of the wider process of 
socioeconomic change towards a ‘post-Fordist’ flexible regime, featured by the fiscal crisis 
of western democracies, the need for public-private coordination, economic globalisation, 
the deep restructuring of state and the growing importance of transnational political 
institutions (Jessop, 1995, 1997). Therefore, the growing interest for governance reflects 
the widespread idea that governing contemporary societies is becoming more and more 
difficult and demanding (Sassen, 1996; Pierre, 1999, 2000).  
So, in a normative sense, governance leads to the need of co-ordinating economic and 
social behaviours through the involvement and participation of multiple actors, thus 
modifying both policy and intervention objectives (from growth control to development 
promotion), and action procedures (from authoritative imposition of choices to negotiated 
consensus building) (Stoker, 1998). This pertains both to the vertical organisation of 
government powers and to the horizontal relationships between governing and governed 
subjects. Governance shows indeed to have a ‘multi-level’ dimension, consisting in the 
emergence of “continuous negotiation among governments at several territorial tiers – 
supra-national, national, regional and local – as the result of broad process of institutional 
creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions 
of the state up to the supra-national level and some down to the local/regional level” 
(Marks, 1993, p. 392; see also: Swyngedouw, 2000). And governance has also a multi-
actor and cross-sectoral dimension, because in any specific policy area all the actors need 
the others, since “no one has all the relevant knowledge or resources to make the policy 
work” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 50; see also: Madanipour et al., 2001).  
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A governance perspective is therefore crucial to land use regulation (and conversely), 
being local choices of spatial development positioned at the crossing point between the 
vertical axis of power and public administration and the horizontal axis of partnership 
between government, private and civil sector. Particularly in the context of new 
governance processes triggered by EU integration (CEC, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2001), a 
specific attention to urban and territorial governance has so taken place in the international 
planning debate (Healey et al., 1995, 2002; Le Galès, 1998, 2002; Brenner, 1999; 
Bagnasco & Le Galès, 2000; Sellers, 2002; Janin Rivolin, 2005; ESPON, 2007a).  
As a matter of fact, after the decision of strengthening integration in order to reduce the 
costs of globalisation (CEC, 1985), the EU has found it necessary to deal with spatial 
development and planning practices, now commonly known under the flag of ‘European 
spatial planning’ (Williams, 1996; Faludi, 2002; Janin Rivolin, 2004; Waterhout, 2008). 
However, being deprived of a formal competence of land use regulation, the EU has 
fostered territorial governance processes based on a principle of performance. This 
applies, not so differently from what argued about performative planning systems (section 
3.2), by the promotion of not-binding spatial policy programmes and the progressive 
promotion of projects that prove themselves capable to perform the agreed collective 
strategy. Therefore, on the one hand, the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP) (CEC, 1999a; Faludi & Waterhout, 2002) is expected to find ‘application’ (rather 
than implementation) in EU member states (Faludi, 2003; ESPON, 2007b). On the other 
hand, according to EU regional policy regulations, only those projects expected to achieve 
effectively the collective strategy agreed by Community programmes (under Structural 
Funds’ mainstream, Interreg, Urban, Leader initiatives, etc., in their turn related to the 
ESDP) can be funded for implementation. Here, the selection of projects according to 
agreed and explicit evaluation criteria, conditioning their possible approval to substantive 
changes, takes a pivotal role in the implementation process. 
In conclusion: institutionalised in the historical phase of the formation of modern states in 
order to allows governments to organise the great urbanisation trends, the most of 
planning systems are still based on the assumption that public development strategies can 
and must be promoted through previous attribution of rules or, in other words, use rights in 
land. If one main advantage of traditional planning systems is to ensure certainty to 
markets and citizens (at least in principle), their worst consequence is to impede an 
effective control of development projects, especially as for their capacity to perform those 
public strategies justifying them. Once plan has assigned new use rights in land, general 
indicators and standards for control are often nothing but blunt arms in the hands of public 
authorities indeed. This, of course, may explain some major difficulties of planning and of 
land use regulation in the course of the 20th century. 
However, even if the balance between strengths and weaknesses of modern planning 
systems could be accepted in a ‘government perspective’ addressed to guide the great 
urbanisation trends, it appears to become more and more unsustainable in a ‘governance 
perspective’ addressed to face problems and opportunities posed by contemporary 
development trends. On the one hand, development features are indeed no more 
determined by needs of unconditioned growth, but more and more related to regeneration 
opportunities and sustainability conditions. An effective public control of development 
projects performance with respect to shared collective strategies is therefore 
indispensable. On the other hand, one lesson learnt after more than a century of urban 
and regional transformations is that, also in the absence of guaranteed development 
rights, clear policy strategies supported by adequate consensus are the best antidote 
against markets’ uncertainty risks. This is precisely what, lacking of any formal power on 
land use regulation, EU territorial governance is made of.  
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4.3. Planning systems (in Europe) are innovating towards ‘performance’ objectives 
Various aspects and effects of EU territorial and urban governance are identified as factors 
concurring to determinate innovation in planning practices and institutions13. After all, it 
was soon possible to acknowledge that “the current configuration of a spatial planning 
policy at a European level manifests a recourse to new policy processes, instruments and 
techniques” (Giannakourou, 1996, p. 608). EU territorial and urban governance was 
therefore supposed to foster a “creeping material innovation” in domestic planning too 
(Janin Rivolin, 2003, p. 55). Nobody would be in general adverse today to consider EU 
territorial and urban governance “as a basic driver of planning innovation” (Janin Rivolin & 
Faludi, 2005, p. 212). Since resources, rules and ideas are the main drivers for 
transforming governance frameworks (Healey, 2006), it seems acceptable that “the 
introduction of such drivers at the EU level may start new processes of domestic policy 
transformation and innovation” (Waterhout, 2007, p. 312).  
So, EU territorial governance would tend to innovate planning systems on the long term, 
involving uneasy but progressive transformations of administrative and social traditions, as 
it shows “to be leading to a measure of convergence or harmonization of systems, 
although this creates tensions as changes in administrative systems run ahead of changes 
in the social model” (Nadin & Stead, 2008, p. 45). 
Coherently with these assumptions, a provisional essay of application of the proposed 
conceptualisation (section 2) may suggest that, under the effect of EU territorial 
governance, more recent innovation trends in (European) planning systems are perhaps 
turning towards aims of performance, even whereas systems are of conformative nature. 
Taking the Italian planning system (being more familiar to the author) as one possible 
application example, a brief historical review of its evolution may lead to argue that about 
four cycles of innovation have been accomplished since the establishment of a national 
planning culture during the 1920-30s, while a fifth one might be in course (Figure 5). 
Apart from previous experiences of partial and specific legislation, the first even 
institutional codification of the Italian planning system was indeed the 1942 national 
framework Law No. 1150, still currently in force (CEC, 2000b). This established, by the 
others, that land use regulation is pivoted on a conformative local plan (Piano regolatore 
generale), based on prescriptive zoning design of future developments. Various problems 
of public land use regulation aroused during the post-war period, in which building activity 
recorded an unprecedented boom trend in Italy. This led to a partial and provisional reform 
of national planning system by 1967 Law No. 765 (so called legge ponte or ‘bridge law’) 
which, coherently with the adopted conformative approach, introduced precise zoning 
typologies, quantitative indicators and minimum standards for public services and 
infrastructures provision. Similarly, problems regarding public budget shortage and plans 
implementation in the 1970s led to 1977 Law No. 10, establishing that development 
permissions should be onerous and providing local plans with a ‘multi-annual 
implementation programme’ (Piano pluriennale di attuazione). In the same years, however, 
a major change regarding the Italian planning system was also the extension of legislation 
powers in planning to regions, as late application of 1948 Italian Constitution.  
  
                                            
13 According to Colomb (2007, p. 363), innovation can particularly “come from two processes: 1. from 
working in cooperation with other actors who are perceived to possess specific knowledge, innovative or 
‘good practices’ in a given policy field; or 2. from the very fact of problematizing and addressing certain policy 
issues at a new transnational scale (i.e. the rescaling of the frame of reference used to address specific 
policy issues towards a transnationalization of the problem setting and agenda)”. 
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Figure 5 – Main innovation cycles in the Italian planning system 
 
 
So, a progressive regionalisation of territorial and urban policies in the 1980s (Putnam, 
1993) was the scenario welcoming the first hints of EU territorial governance. As for Italy, 
these had a major impact through urban development and local practices, as experienced 
since the pioneer initiatives of Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and of Urban Pilot 
Projects (Janin Rivolin, 2003). The introduction of urban ‘integrated intervention 
programmes’ (Programmi integrati d’intervento) as of 1992 Law No. 179 was therefore the 
institutional provision allowing national authorities to coordinate urban development in 
cooperation with regions through various ministerial programmes based on the Urban 
Community Initiative model during the 1990s. In the emerging multi-level governance 
context, also multi-actor and cross-sector activities were enhanced in order to improve the 
performance of proposed spatial developments. This was codified by new tools of inter-
institutional partnership, such as the ‘programme agreement’ (Accordo di programma) as 
of Law no. 142/1990, and the ‘conference of services’ (Conferenza dei servizi) as of Law 
no. 241/1990, promoting negotiations to co-ordinate actions taken by administrations or 
public agencies; and such as the ‘framework programme agreement’ (Accordo di 
programma quadro) as of Law no. 662/1996, addressed to provide an advanced 
contractual model for public/private partnership. 
More recent proliferation of ‘strategic plans’, spontaneously elaborated and adopted by 
various Italian cities and local communities (despite the absence of any specific 
legislation), and recurring claims and law proposals for some substantial reform of the 
planning system may bear witness of a further innovation cycle being in course. Whether 
and how it will succeed are, of course, matters for possible discussion. Current trends of 
urban and regional planning seem however to confirm an increasing acknowledgement of 
the need of performance in planning practices, with a possible removal from the traditional 
conformative approach of the Italian planning system. Of course, path dependence and 
attachment to traditional approaches are also playing a major role in the evolving scenario, 
insofar as the achievement of a shared technical awareness is as usually uneasy. 
Although deserving further scrutiny and verification, the above account on the Italian 
planning system’s evolution supports basically the supposed conceptualisation of planning 
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systems behaving as institutional technologies (section 2). A major reliability of those 
concepts would require of course a wider and more attentive application with reference to 
several planning systems. This might regard, for instance, the evolution occurred through 
1947, 1968 and 1990 Town and Country Planning Acts and 2004 Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act in the UK (CEC, 2000a; Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002; Nadin & 
Stead, 2008); or through the 1965 Spatial Planning Act, its major amendments in 1985 and 
1994, till the new 2006 Spatial Planning Act in the Netherlands (CEC, 1999b; Needham, 
2005; Spaans, 2006); and so forth.  
Moreover, the above account on Italy suggests that EU territorial governance, if 
understood as a new experiential context, may have posed the conditions for a ‘change of 
sign’ of planning innovations from the aim of ‘conformance’ (an “action in accordance with 
some specified standard or authority”, as defined by the Encyclopaedia Britannica Online) 
to the one of ‘performance’ (“the fulfilment of a claim, promise, or request”, according to 
the same source). In this light, a wider application of the same concepts to other planning 
systems might provide with a common and more systematic frame for analysis current 
theoretical discussions and policy debates on future directions for planning (Allmendinger 
& Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Healey, 2006b) as well as on EU territorial governance (ESPON, 
2007a; MUDTCEU, 2007; Faludi, 2007; Waterhout, 2008). 
It is worth considering, in conclusion, that this would not be a banal comparison producing 
obvious results. Although some problems in agenda and even solutions are indeed 
expectable to recur in various planning systems, depending on global socio-economic and 
cultural trends, it is also probable that each process is triggered by different experiences 
and follows different trajectories because, basically, institutional frameworks in which 
planning operates and evolves are different. A firm point should be however that, possible 
differences notwithstanding, planning systems can be never seen as static objects; 
everywhere they operate instead as evolving technologies, addressed to improve land use 
regulation opportunities through progressive innovation.   
 
4.4. Performance of planning systems is different from the performance of plans 
As above recalled, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online defines ‘performance’ as the 
“execution of an action, something accomplished” or the “fulfilment of a claim, promise, or 
request”. Wikipedia strengthens the meaning of “carrying into execution or action; 
execution; achievement; accomplishment” (see: http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/performance). 
This term is often used in opposition to ‘conformance’ (or conformity), which the same 
sources define rather as the “correspondence in form, manner, or character”; an “action in 
accordance with some specified standard or authority”; a “state of things being similar, or 
identical”. Of course, performance and conformance are not new concepts for planning. 
Particularly, the discussions on strategic planning (Healey et al., 1997; Salet & Faludi, 
2000; Albrechts et al., 2003; Albrechts, 2004, 2006; Healey, 2006b) and, later, on 
European spatial planning have posed a clear distinction between performance-based and 
conformance-based approaches to planning and to plans evaluation (Alexander & Faludi, 
1989; Faludi, 1989, 2000, 2006; Mastop, 1997; Mastop & Faludi, 1997). Marking the 
difference between regulative plans as ‘technical exercises’ and strategic plans as 
‘learning processes’, planning theorists convene usually that whereas the former are 
considered for their capacity in ‘shaping spatial development’ (conformance criterion), the 
latter should be rather evaluated for their capacity in ‘shaping the minds of actors in spatial 
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development’ (performance criterion)14. In this light, ‘application’ is said to be a concept 
more suitable to indicate the performance of strategic plans15, usually occurring at regional 
or even wider scales16, whilst ‘implementation’ is intended to remain a task concerned by 
regulative local plans17. 
To accept the above recalled argument does not prevent the observation that, since its 
trueness is based on the assumption of at least two types of plans (strategic supra-local 
plans and regulative local plans) coexisting in every planning system, the adopted 
meaning of ‘performance’ cannot apply to planning systems themselves (and to planning 
as a whole). To define performance as the capacity in shaping the minds of actors in 
spatial development indeed fits well to plans that, for their institutional nature, are not 
addressed directly to be implemented and to shape spatial development. But any attempt 
to employ the same definition for planning systems (or to planning as a whole), which 
respond to institutional mandates of land use regulation, including the shaping of spatial 
development and its implementation, would simply lead to the conclusion that they can 
only have a conformative nature. 
Therefore, since the case is different, as this paper argued (section 3), performance of 
planning systems needs to be defined otherwise. There is no need to invent anything, 
however. Definitions recalled at the beginning of this section seem to fit perfectly the case. 
In conformative planning systems, the capacity of land use regulation is indeed pursued by 
the attempt to impose “a correspondence in form, manner, or character” to development 
projects, and implementation is intended as “an action in accordance with the standards” 
established by the authority. In performative planning systems, the capacity of land use 
regulation passes rather through the opportunity of obtaining from projects “the fulfilment 
of what claimed, promised or requested” by the plan, and implementation looks primarily at 
the “achievement” or “accomplishment” and at “carrying into execution” the aims of the 
plan. 
So defined, of course, the performance of planning systems (and of planning as a whole) 
is not in contradiction with the performance of strategic plans: it understates the dimension 
of plans as learning processes as well as the importance of shaping the minds of actors in 
spatial development indeed. The performance of planning systems, however, is not limited 
to these aspects because it cannot be regardless of the regulative function of planning 
(section 2.1). In other words, the proposed definition suggests that if territorial governance 
is at stake, the crucial question is not whether (performative) strategic plans are preferable 
to (conformative) regulative plans, but how the strategic and regulative functions of 
planning are or should be differently correlated in a planning system addressed to 
performative (rather than conformative) aims.  
                                            
14 “What is meant by conformance is surely evident. Performance refers to whether decision-makers use a 
planning document, whether it helps clarifying choices, whether the planning document forms part of the 
definition of subsequent decision situations. […] So our judgement must rest on whether, in the light of the 
messages from the plan, the actor’s choices have been well considered, and not on whether the outcome 
conforms to the plan” (Faludi, 2006, pp. 123-125). 
15 “…application is something other than the shaping of spatial development. Application is the shaping of 
minds of actors in spatial development. […] In terms of this discussion we might say, performance is a 
question of whether, and how, those concerned apply a planning document” (Faludi, 2006, pp. 120-123). 
16 “Strategic planning occurs where there is uncertainty, with the involvement of many actors adding to the 
complexity of the situation. Whilst it can occurs at the local level, these conditions are more common at 
regional and national and even more so at the level of the European Union” (Faludi, 2006, p. 122). 
17 “Talking about implementation complements the view of planning as a technical exercise. Talking […] 
about application complements that of planning as a learning process” (Faludi, 2006, p. 119). 
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